

















































4. Reasons why coercion to enhance might be objectionable 	What	considerations	could	make	indirect	coercion	to	use	neuroenhancers	morally	more	problematic	than	coercion	to	use	the	technological	devices	that	represent	the	current	“normal”?	I	will	begin	by	considering	one	difference	that	quickly	comes	to	mind:	the	invasive	nature	of	neuroenhancers,	in	virtue	of	which	any	coercive	pressure	to	use	them	might	be	said	to	violate	people’s	right	to	bodily	integrity.	I	will	argue	that	while	this	consideration	does	show	compulsion	to	enhance,	as	well	as	most	cases	of	direct	coercion,	to	be	ethically	objectionable,	this	does	not	extend	to	indirect	coercion.	I	will	then	look	at	three	other	factors	which	I	do	take,	when	present,	to	render	indirect	coercion	to	enhance	problematic,	and	which	might	misleadingly	suggest	that	such	coercion	is	objectionable	in	its	own	right:	these	factors	are	lack	of	safety,	fostering	adaptation	to	oppressive	circumstances,	and	having	negative	side	effects	that	go	beyond	health.		













4.3 Fostering adaptation to oppressive circumstances and corrupting a 




















5. Possible objections 	I	will	conclude	by	considering	potential	objections	that	might	be	leveled	at	the	analysis	I	have	offered.	As	I	cannot	pretend	to	be	exhaustive,	I	will	limit	myself	to	three	that	come	readily	to	mind.		












5.3 Wouldn’t the “new normal” create oppressive circumstances? 	This	reply	can	help	us	answer	a	third	and	final	objection,	which	would	ask	what	prevents	Neo-Luddites	themselves	from	arguing	that	they	have	a	significant	interest	in	staying	away	from	computers	and	also,	presumably,	from	neuroenhancers.	After	all,	whatever	one	thinks	of	their	beliefs	about	technology,	they	surely	have	a	strong	interest	in	being	able	to	live	in	accordance	with	them.	Such	an	ability	does	seem	to	represent	an	important	component	of	a	good	human	life.	On	my	own	account,	then,	can’t	the	Neo-Luddites	complain	of	being	forced	to	adjust	to	oppressive	circumstances?	And	won’t	the	same	be	true	of	all	the	opponents	to	neuroenhancement,	if	it	ever	becomes	the	new	normal?		Two	things	should	be	said	in	response.	First,	it	is	not	clear	that	Neo-Luddites	are	completely	unable	to	live	in	accordance	with	their	personal	beliefs,	even	amid	the	ubiquity	of	modern	technology	in	contemporary	society.	Indeed,	they	can	still	avoid	using	such	technology	whenever	possible,	and	express	their	condemnation	of	it	in	oral	or	written	form,	as	authors	like	Sale	and	Glendinning	have	been	doing.	Admittedly,	there	is	a	significant	cost	to	such	avoidance,	and	sometimes	avoidance	is	simply	not	an	option,	in	which	case	compromises	are	required.	But	this	is	still	not	the	same	as	having	no	leeway	to	follow	one’s	Neo-Luddite	beliefs.	Similar	remarks	would	apply	to	those	who	opposed	neuroenhancement	in	a	world	in	which	it	had	become	the	“new	normal”.		It	might	be	objected	here	that	the	compromises	that	people	with	such	convictions	would	have	to	make	would	be	very	significant	indeed,	and	that	this	
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would	largely	deprive	them	of	the	good	of	being	able	to	follow	these	convictions.	This	leads	me	to	my	second	point:	the	extent	to	which	such	people	can	be	said	to	be	facing	oppressive	circumstances	and	to	be	deprived	of	an	important	human	good	partly	arguably	depends	on	the	plausiblity	of	the	beliefs	that	they	want	to	follow.	And	I	would	claim	that,	because	those	beliefs	are	not	supported	by	truly	persuasive	arguments	in	the	case	of	the	Neo-Luddites	and	of	those	who	oppose	neuroenhancement	under	any	form,	the	good	that	these	people	might	miss	out	on	by	living	in	a	society	where	such	interventions	have	become	the	norm	is	not	of	the	same	magnitude	as	the	sacrifice	of	one’s	self-respect	or	the	long-term	loss	of	work-life	balance.	As	a	result,	their	circumstances	are	not	plausibly	characterized	as	oppressive,	even	though	they	may	experience	them	as	such.	Being	unable	to	fully	live	out	one’s	personal	philosophy	is	not	necessarily	enough,	absent	any	constraints	on	the	content	of	that	philosophy,	to	count	as	finding	oneself	in	oppressive	circumstances.	People	whose	personal	philosophy	or	religion	tells	them	that	friendships	are	vicious,	or	that	civilization	is	evil,	arguably	do	not	count	as	living	in	oppressive	circumstances	if	they	find	themselves	unable	to	avoid	all	friendships	or	all	contact	with	the	fruits	of	modern	civilization	–	even	though	society	should	avoid	hindering	their	pursuit	of	their	own	conception	of	the	good,	provided	that	this	does	not	entail	unacceptable	social	costs.31		
6. Conclusion 	If	the	central	argument	I	have	presented	here	is	correct,	the	prospect	of	neuroenhancement	becoming	the	“new	normal”	is	not,	in	itself,	a	proper	source	of	ethical	concern,	insofar	as	the	coercive	pressures	it	would	create	would	be	of	the	indirect	type	(as	opposed	to	compulsion	and	most	cases	of	direct	coercion,	which	are	indeed	problematic	in	themselves	and	should	be	forestalled	by		31	And	if	we	suppose,	again,	that	the	Neo-Luddite	position	is	in	fact	more	plausible	than	I	incline	to	believe,	it	might	then	become	appropriate	to	say	that	Neo-Luddites	are	currently	facing	oppressive	circumstances.	But	this	would	not	simply	be	because	they	are	unable	to	fully	live	in	accordance	with	their	personal	philosophy:	rather,	it	would	be	because	they	are	(by	hypothesis)	suffering	the	harms	from	technology	that	that	philosophy	has	identified.	
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appropriate	regulation).	Nevertheless,	there	are	various	distinct	factors	that	could	make	the	advent	of	this	“new	normal”	problematic.	I	have	tried	to	spell	out	what	these	factors	might	be.			The	question	then	becomes:	once	we	acknowledge	the	relevance	of	those	factors,	will	we	end	up	agreeing,	when	it	comes	to	regulating	neuroenhancement,	with	those	who	believe	that	coercion	to	enhance	should	be	opposed	as	such?	The	answer	will	depend	on	whether	neuroenhancers	already	exist,	or	at	least	can	reasonably	be	anticipated	in	the	near	future,	that	are	both	effective,	safe,	and	can	be	widely	used	without	leading	to	the	ethical	pitfalls	I	have	described.	Further	empirical	evidence	will	be	needed	to	establish	this.	At	any	rate,	given	the	contingent	nature	of	the	link	between	these	pitfalls	and	neuroenhancement	use,	it	is	important	to	be	clear	about	what	our	justification	is	if	we	do	decide	that	safeguards	against	indirect	coercion	are	needed,	so	that	we	can	identify	what	sort	of	future,	improved	interventions	might	in	principle	render	that	justification	obsolete.	Whether	or	not	such	safeguards	are	appropriate,	however,	it	remains	desirable	for	society	to	promote,	within	the	limits	of	practicality,	a	spirit	of	tolerance	for	dissenters	from	technology	that	would	mitigate	the	costs	they	will	unavoidably	have	to	bear	as	a	consequence	of	their	personal	beliefs.		Word	count:	13,209	w.	(including	footnotes,	excluding	references)			
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